Imperial Defence, 1868-1887 (Cass Series: Naval Policy and History) by Donald MacKenzie Schurman

Author:Donald MacKenzie Schurman [Schurman, Donald MacKenzie]
Language: eng
Format: azw
ISBN: 9781135265656
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Published: 2014-02-24T16:00:00+00:00

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The Royal Commission Reports

The first report of the ‘Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad’concerned the defensive priority of the Cape of Good Hope, and the need for police forces in colonies to enable troops to be withdrawn from non-essential imperial work in wartime.1 It also enunciated some general principles concerning the interrelation of volume trade, coal and steamships in war. The Cape’s perceived importance spurred this report’s production very early in the proceedings, for the commissioners were so ‘impressed by these considerations that they postponed to this one all other questions committed to them, and made Cape defence the subject of their first and most pressing recommendation’.2 This emphasis was not surprising, considering Carnarvon’s past interest in South Africa as a whole and his continuing interest in the necessity of defending the Cape Peninsula in particular. Indeed, his ideas regarding South African policy generally hinged on his appreciation of the colony’s location as a vital focal area for ships passing between India and the United Kingdom.3

The report underscored the economic importance of the Cape, for it calculated the annual value of passing trade at £150,000,000, assuming the Suez Canal to be unusable.4 Since there was no secure base for naval operations between the Lizard and the Cape, excepting Gibraltar, the Cape’s security in wartime was of vital importance, since it would certainly be a major trade concentration point. Adequately defended coaling facilities was not the sole consideration: the Cape was valued also as a port of refuge for merchant vessels and as a supply point for the relief and supplementation of Indian and Far Eastern defences.5

Yet considering the importance the commissioners attached to the area, their recommendations were particularly unsatisfactory. The navy headquarters at Simons Bay, with its secure anchorage, was acknowledged to be ‘as indispensable to Your Majesty’s Navy’on the recommendation of local experts, despite the fact that Cape Town’s harbour at Table Bay possessed docks and jetties offering coaling and repair facilities far in advance of the primitive facilities at the navy site, where little more than fresh water was available. This was a concession to naval habit, and since the naval base displayed no prospects for commercial development, the total cost of fortifying it would devolve entirely on the home government. But the docking and coaling facilities at Table Bay were so good that defence was imperative, meaning that two places in close proximity would have to be fortified, were the commissioners’recommendations heeded. They indicated awareness of the need for some sort of cost division between the home and colonial governments regarding Table Bay, but made no specific recommendations.6 Numbers of guns or batteries were not specified: only armament type was definitely suggested.7 Manpower recommendations were not, however, so circumspect. A proposed garrison of 4,000 was to be composed of 3,000 imperials and 1,000 local volunteers. A gunboat for Table Bay and torpedo launches for both Simons and Table Bay completed the recommendations.8

If Cape defence was so

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